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**ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT IN MULTINATIONAL PEACE
OPERATIONS: A STRATEGIC REVIEW**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL DARRELL L. ROLL
United States Army**

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Achieving Unity of Effort in Multinational Peace Operations: A Strategic Review

by

LTC Darrell L. Roll

Dr. William T. Johnsen
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

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The complex security environment makes unity of command difficult to achieve at the strategic level. Unity of effort has become the central means of ensuring unified direction at the strategic and operational levels. Multinational peace operations, in particular, increase the number of actors and exacerbate the difficulties in achieving unified direction. The study examines how unity of effort is achieved at the strategic level within multinational peace operations. To achieve the objective of multinational and multiagency cooperation, this study examines the concepts of unity of command and unity of effort, reviews the problem of focus, and then proposes mechanisms that contribute to focus and coordinated execution. The study recommends options to achieve greater unity of effort at the strategic level for the 21st Century.

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Introduction

The complex security environment makes unity of command difficult to achieve at the strategic level. Unity of effort, therefore, has become the central means of ensuring unified strategic direction. Conditions usually inherent in peace operations--such as an increased number of actors, an ad hoc nature of command, force and sustainment arrangements, an inability to impose unity of command, and a more complex civil-military dimension--complicate the ability to achieve unity of effort at the strategic or, frequently, operational level.¹

Unity of effort among allies and partners is increasingly important to national governments because of reductions in forces, as well as the increased demand for peacekeeping operations in a transnational world. As a result, the role of international coalitions and alliances has dramatically expanded:

In today's security environment, two trends contribute to the growing importance and relevance of collective action. First, the scale of transnational problems far exceeds the ability and willingness of any one nation or organization to respond. Second, new technologies have made possible new linkages between nations and organizations--linkages that can facilitate increased cooperation.²

Because of these difficulties and demands for collective action, the issue of unity of effort cannot be left to chance. Such common purpose can be achieved only by intent and through design. The means to achieve unity of effort at the strategic

level, specifically within multinational peace operations, has become a key issue facing defense officials and military practitioners.

To provide insights into resolving this conundrum, this paper will first examine the nuances of unity of command and unity of effort. The next section explores how to promote focus by analyzing the key elements that assist in that effort: the actors and fora, unity among allies and national partners, unity of effort within the U.S. government, unity of effort within the military, and unity with civil-military operations. The third section examines how mechanisms, particularly structures, alliances, and agreements; shared information; liaison; common doctrine; and planning contribute to focus. The paper closes with conclusions and recommendations.

Understanding Concepts

Doctrinally, unity of command refers to **interlocking web of responsibility** which is the foundation of trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires **clear delineation of responsibility** among commanders--up, down, and laterally.³ Unity of effort, on the other hand, is defined as **coordination and cooperation** among all forces, not necessarily part of the same command structure, toward a commonly recognized

objective.⁴ Multinational unity of effort includes the principles of common understanding, coordinated policy, and trust and confidence among nations.⁵ The essence of both unity of command and unity of effort is found in a clearly established, common focus, which will be the major thread of the discussion that follows.

Strive for Focus: Clear Aims and Objectives

The Actors and the Fora

The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus are prerequisites for unity of effort.⁶ But articulating aims and objectives is no easy task. Indeed, growing collective actions between nations and multiagencies will increase the complexity of achieving focus. As J. David Whaley, Resident Representative of the United Nations (UN) Development Programme in South Africa, notes:

A critical lack of clarity exists...[causing] confusion at the institutional and the operational level; this is particularly true with respect to the relative responsibilities and mandates of the different actors involved in international assistance and cooperation, different departments and agencies of the UN and other multilateral bodies, bilateral actors and the non-governmental organization (NGO) community.⁷

To achieve unity of effort within multinational peace operations, therefore, strategic leaders must first understand the actors,

their interaction, and the significance of cooperative and innovative means used to achieve focus.

The increase in the number of governmental, non-governmental, national, international, and multinational actors, however, creates major obstacles in achieving that focus. For example, different national interests sometimes lead to conflicting national objectives among coalition partners. Contradictory policies on using political, economic, military, informational instruments of power, and diverse cultural approaches create friction. Different experiences and varying capabilities also complicate efforts to achieve focus. Moreover, the rising number of international organizations (IOs), particularly NGOs and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), further complicates leaders' ability to focus and achieve unity of effort.

Equally daunting are the number and types of fora that actors use at the international and national level. At the **international level**, there are *multilateral organizations* (i.e., League of Arab States, Organization of American States, and Organization of African Unity) and *regional alliances* (i.e., North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and Western European Union (WEU)); *international organizations* like United Nation's organizations

(i.e., Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)); *NGOs and PVOs* (i.e., Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)); and *bilateral relations* (i.e., through diplomatic envoys between Ambassador and Heads of State or between Heads of State).

At the **national level**, there are *national governmental organizations* (i.e., the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council); *interagency working groups* (IWGs); *individual agencies and departments* working together (i.e., State and Defense Departments); and *national civilian agencies* (i.e., United States Agency for International Development (USAID)) that work with the international community.

Peace operations complicate the already difficult process of achieving unity of effort because such operations cut across all levels of the hierarchy. This requires peacekeepers to be able to cooperate with and within all levels. For example, the operational Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander deals not only with multiple nations (i.e., through military exercises and peace operations), but also, directly with IOs and NGOs/PVOs-- organizations often representing the strategic level. Frequently, commanders also coordinate between Services, within DoD, and with other government agencies.

Focus and Unity Among Nations

Ultimately, cooperation between nations is achieved through shared aims and objectives. Focus in multinational operations starts at the top--at the strategic level through diplomatic, economic and military means. Focus is achieved by diplomatic means through treaties, collaborative efforts in regional organizations (i.e., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)), building coalitions, multilateral agreements, and nation-to-nation diplomatic relations. The coherence of diplomatic means provide the necessary focus to achieve unity of effort in multinational operations.

Focus by economic means is achieved through established collaborative bodies, organizations and funds. At the international level, the following examples show how economic focus is achieved at that level: the G-7, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which promotes international monetary cooperation and currency stabilization, and the World Bank which provides loans and technical assistance for economic development. At the national level, the United States and other countries provide foreign aid.

Military means to achieve focus, at the international and regional level, include regional security organizations (i.e.,

NATO, WEU) and multilateral coordination (i.e., Partnership for Peace (PfP)) to promote stability. At the regional and the operational level, military-to-military contacts are used extensively to implement regional strategy in concert with allies and other partners. Agreeing upon goals, objectives, and endstates becomes a key element in reaching an overall strategy. Building a consensus to achieve this focus requires resolute and consistent coordination. Also, Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) use bilateral military-to-military events to further aims and enhance interoperability. Among nations, these organizations and programs advance military focus and, therefore, unity of effort.

Focus and Unity Among Government Agencies

Recent growth in peace operations has challenged government agencies to work more closely with other agencies in a multiagency environment to achieve peacemaking and peacekeeping objectives. Unity of effort within the U.S. government should be easier to achieve, especially when each agency works toward common objectives defined by National Security Strategy (NSS). But is this the case?

The complexity of responsibilities and interactions between agencies has drawn mixed reviews. For example, interagency cooperation during the Haiti operation was a marked improvement

over Somalia.⁸ However, problems still exist in interagency cooperation. Former Senator Sam Nunn notes, for example, that organizational shortcomings in the interagency system sometimes undermine, the ability of agencies to carry out their tasks.

Nunn specifically notes:

Today's security challenges require integrating the activities of many departments and agencies, some not traditionally viewed as contributors to national security....New members, especially the **Attorney General** and the **Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce**, may need to be **formally added to the National Security Council** [bold added for emphasis].⁹

Furthermore, while economic and commerce representatives may attend some NSC IAWG sessions, they lack a coordinating mechanism for consistent decisionmaking within the NSC staff.¹⁰

A key element of the interagency process is to ensure the appropriate integration of instruments of power--integration which is critical for success in any multinational peace operation. Because strategic endeavors theoretically involve applying all instruments of national power (political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military), suitable instruments must be carefully blended to achieve success.¹¹ Blending begins at the highest levels--at the national level--through strategy development (e.g., National Security Strategy (NSS), Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)). Selected instruments

also must be applied properly in the theater of operation. A CINC's strategy, therefore, must be derived from and consonant with national strategy.¹² Instruments of power will affect each other and, consequently, "success in complex contingency operations requires that all aspects of a crisis--political, security, humanitarian, economic--be addressed in a coordinated fashion nearly simultaneously."¹³

Failure to integrate instruments adequately can lead to ill-focused strategy. The Somalia operation illustrates this shortcoming, where a lack of focus resulted in the economic instrument of power working against the political-military instruments of power. In this case, the U.S. humanitarian relief monetization strategy¹⁴ had the greatest potential to end the economic chaos in Somalia. But it was widely misunderstood; subsequently, military and humanitarian aims were not achieved. Writing about the "economics of chaos" in Somalia, Andrew S. Natsios, Vice-President of Worldvision Relief and Development observed that:

The chaos and relief effort together conspired unknowingly to create a set of pernicious incentives which simultaneously corrupted...the merchant class...increased the demand for weapons...caused an increase in supply...reinforced power of...the warlords.¹⁵

To preclude similar future failure, the U.S. needs to change the law to expand the NSC by formally adding, at a minimum, the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce. This will help ensure the international and national economic instruments of power are fully integrated at the highest level. Furthermore, the NSC staff must fully integrate all the appropriate economic considerations into plans and policy development.¹⁶ Ultimately, the issue of unity of effort within the U.S. government devolves to the problem of focus, which can be achieved through proper assignment of all agencies' responsibility and authority.

Focus and Unity Within the Military

The third issue is unity of effort within the U.S. military instrument of power. In ten years of implementing the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the U.S. military has achieved a greater ability to focus. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides a common focus through his vision, which is guided in large part by the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Vision 2010. The NMS, based on the NSS, provides advice on national military objectives, force structure and support requirements. JSCP provides strategic guidance to CINCs, Service Chiefs and Agencies, and apportions forces for the near-term planning.

Joint Vision 2010 describes future joint operational concepts, identifies national security needs, and recommends defense missions for the long-term.

Goldwater-Nichols also strengthened the role of the CINCs in achieving their warfighting missions (e.g., the Act addressed the command functions of giving authoritative direction, prescribed the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINC). This was done primarily through the clarification of roles and responsibilities.¹⁷ As Assistant Secretary of Defense James Locher III has noted, Goldwater-Nichols has balanced the authority and responsibility of the CINCs and increased the effective performance of their commands in operations and peacetime activities.¹⁸ Thus, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White has described the lasting legacy of Goldwater-Nichols: it "enabled the Joint Chiefs, services, and CINCs to focus on core competencies and encouraged them to work together."¹⁹

While consensus indicates that joint efforts have steadily improved strategic and operational focus, the job is not yet finished.²⁰ What remains to be done? One critic argues that CINCs need to improve regional strategy:

...strategy document is needed to integrate the many U.S. and multilateral regional activities involved. CINCs must account for U.S. policy and interests, alliances, economic

and political issues....A strategy document facilitates the U.S. interagency cooperation and support that a CINC often will need for mission success....There is little consensus about what constitutes a CINC's strategy.²¹

Thus, the development of a CINC's strategic document offers one way to improve strategic and operational focus--which ultimately impacts directly on unity of effort in regional peace operations.

Focus and Unity With Civil-Military Operations

To complicate matters, peace operations are not simply military operations. Such operations include numerous civilian actors, governmental and nongovernmental. The military interfaces with multinational, national, and military participants. In such operations, civil-military aims and objectives must be carefully developed. Learning each other's culture, assignment of clear roles and responsibilities, working together in operation centers, early planning and training are just a few examples on how military and civilian cooperation can be improved. Though it may be too early to capture definitive lessons learned, recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, certainly have provided insights, particularly the need to clarify missions between military and humanitarian organizations²², to establish and maintain partnership between nongovernmental organizations and the armed forces²³, and to keep the military mission clear and feasible.²⁴

In summary, achieving common aims and objectives, and ensuring strategic focus have demonstrably emerged as the fundamental prerequisites for unity of effort. Multinational partners, national actors, and military forces must strive for and achieve focus through collective action by integrating: all appropriate instruments of national power, all agencies involved in the process, and ultimately, achieving a workable, consensus-based strategy for dealing with the new security issues.

Developing Structures and Mechanisms that Contribute to Focus and Coordination

These efforts, alone, may not be sufficient to ensure adequate unity of effort. Structures and mechanisms that promote coordination and enhance focus also will need to be developed or sustained. Such mechanisms include developing and maintaining alliances and agreements, developing shared information, liaison, common doctrine and planning.

Develop and Maintain Alliances and Agreements

Unity of effort is gained by maintaining existing alliances and developing new alliances, where possible. Organizations such as NATO with its existing structure provide the "backbone" mechanisms for coordination. For example, NATO's long-standing structure contributes significantly to unity of effort in IFOR [Implementation Force in Bosnia].²⁵

As new members are added to NATO through expansion, NATO serves to provide common focus, mechanisms and procedures for collective operations. Alliance initiatives such as PfP assist in integrating new members. In Bosnia, the U.S. Armed Forces, their allies, and Russians are also achieving international cooperation in a collective environment.²⁶

One of the basic prerequisites to integration is developing cooperative joint procedures. To illustrate how mechanisms are used to enhance effective peace operations, General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, talks about the use of coordination cells:

Eighteen nations now have full-time representatives assigned to the Partnership Coordination Cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe....By working and exercising with each other, these nations develop common procedures through PfP that will enhance interoperability...enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate with other nations.²⁷

If formal structures are not possible, then coalitions that accommodate common interests should be constructed. Coalitions will require special mechanisms to achieve unity of effort. Coalition development is an integral part of our military strategy and ultimately promotes unity of effort. "As coalition forces become more integrated, command and control becomes more complex."²⁸ Unity is achieved through adequate command

arrangements and command and control mechanisms. For example, during the Gulf War:

The contingency operation in the Persian Gulf provided neither the time, personnel, nor political will to develop an integrated command structure. Instead, General Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, developed a dual command structure for the coalition that would provide the requisite unity of effort.²⁹

Another promising coalition mechanism is the development of the combined joint task force concept (CJTF). Admiral Paul Miller, former Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, describes the CJTF concept as:

...both a process and a structure. As a process, it equips the alliance to assemble and groom forces and capabilities to operate together. As a structure, it provides a command and control architecture for NATO to direct and employ a combined (coalition) operation...CJTF is a concept enabling NATO's member nations to deal effectively with issues that fall outside of the alliance's traditional boundaries; moreover, it provides a mechanism through which both NATO and non-NATO nations can participate in expanded coalition activities.³⁰

Through such a combined organization, CJTF provides a more detailed structure that promotes greater focus by establishing clear command and control arrangements, defining communication arrangements, enhancing operational procedures, and promoting cooperative planning. Inclusion of multinational military and multiagency actors into the CJTF will greatly enhance future

cooperative relationships and eventually produce a culture developed through close coordination over the years.

When established structures are not possible within coalition and alliances, other mechanisms such as agreements must be developed. In view of today's constrained budgets, the growth of new or larger organizations is highly unlikely. But agreements, especially long-term ones, provide a solid foundation for coordination.³¹ Some standard agreements can be applied in coalition arrangements. When common agreements among actors is not possible, several bilateral agreements may be necessary to bind the coalition together.

Develop Shared Information

Various national forces will adapt unevenly to the Information Age. Therefore, special arrangements will be necessary for ensuring unity of effort within alliances and coalitions.³² Information is shared not only through technology and information systems; it also must be shared with different cultures, among nations, or between governments and nongovernmental organizations. Thus, while technology will enhance information sharing, the need to interface and conduct face-to-face coordination will not diminish. In an environment of increasing multinational and multiagency operations--where

decisionmaking from the national level to the theater level and from the theater strategic to the tactical level is compressed-- effective mechanisms (as will be discussed later) are needed to overcome barriers to shared information.

Experience with recent humanitarian organizations has revealed several challenges in sharing information during operations. These challenges include comprehending motives, interests and positions of all players; understanding relationships and roles; combining and integrating overlapping roles; and resolving tension and reaching consensus.³³ Because civil-military interaction is sporadic, shared understanding does not occur easily. Subsequent misunderstandings can inhibit effective sharing of mutually needed information. Indeed, as Colonel Guy Swan has pointed out in Military Review:

Effective information-sharing measures between NGOs and the military begin at the national policy-making level. Ideally, confidence building begins well before a CHE [complex humanitarian emergency] erupts. Early consultation among interagency working groups and executive NGO representatives before military operation execution is essential.³⁴

Cohesive relationships can be developed early through collectively planning for potential crises prior to their occurrence, developing common procedures for planning operations,

and providing common training within the same institutions, especially for enhancing communications capabilities.

Perhaps one of the best ways to assure shared information is through negotiations.³⁵ Increasingly, negotiations are conducted at several levels--multinationally; nationally; among nations and IOs, NGOs, and PVOs; at the military operational level; and between JTFs and UN agencies. This complex web of negotiations requires across-the-board efforts to build consensus. All parties must exercise "tact, diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning."³⁶ Negotiations training also provides the skills to build relationships that contribute to unity of effort in current as well as follow-on requirements. Ultimately, parties on all sides strive to optimize, normally, on the possible outcomes for all parties. When mutual benefits are recognized, unity of effort usually follows.

Despite increasing reliance on technology and automation to promote communications among alliance or coalition members, human negotiating skills will be important in future efforts to build and sustain unity of effort. Indeed, a 1993 War College study suggested that "there is a greater need for military negotiators today and in the near term future than there has been in the

past...there is a need to improve the 'ad hockery' that exists today."³⁷ Additionally, because of downsizing and increased missions, younger field grade officers will find themselves negotiating more and more in multiagency coordination.

Professional military education will have to concentrate more on developing such skills. Limited advancements have been made since the study; for example, a negotiation elective has been added to the Army War College curriculum. A similar program should be added to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), which does not currently offer core or elective courses on negotiations.

Liaison.

Liaison contributes to unity of effort in informal, as well as formal, structures. The growing occurrence of multiagency interaction and multilateral operations, such as Desert Shield/Storm, Bosnia, and PFP, has increased liaison requirements. Increased cooperation with allied forces and, frequently, IOs has increased demands for linguistic capabilities. But the Army has relatively few resources dedicated to liaison efforts, and liaison personnel oftentimes are "taken out of hide" to fulfill necessary liaison activities that contribute to improved unity.

Unity of effort will require extensive use of liaison efforts in future peace operations. As a result, the demand for foreign area officers (FAO) and special operations forces (SOF) will not diminish. These resources will be expected to interface with allied and coalition forces, as in Desert Storm when teams were sent to each major allied and coalition units to provide an interface between units and to ensure interoperability.

Although liaison requirements are not closely managed by personnel and documentation systems, agencies should consider adding more liaison officers and liaison teams to the existing systems. Most of all, agencies and armed forces must not cut liaison officers out of the existing structure.

Although military-to-military and political-to-military coordination has improved through established and ad hoc liaison arrangements, civilian-military coordination has not achieved the same level of integration. The experience in Somalia illustrates this lack of integration:

The [UN] organization is grappling with ... [the] difficulty in integrating military operations with humanitarian assistance programs, and other civilian programs such as human rights, electoral campaigns, and economic rehabilitation, which proved troublesome in Somalia during the mid-1993 period when U.N. Forces come under attack by the forces of Somali warlords.³⁸

Since Somalia, several means for improving civil-military integration have been developed. For example, the UN has produced a handbook that defines coordination mechanisms for civil-military operation centers (CMOC).³⁹ Furthermore, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees highlights the importance of effective liaison.⁴⁰ Also, the U.S. routinely holds training exercises with NGOs.⁴¹ Although these improvements have enhanced integration and improved unity of effort in coordination, much work is left to be done. It is time to overcome the institutional barriers between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Nongovernmental civilian agencies (IOs, PVOs and NGOs) should be invited to Senior Service Colleges and other institutional training as appropriate to enhance unity of effort.

Common doctrine

Another way of improving integration and interoperability and thereby achieving unity of effort is through common doctrine. Doctrine provides military organizations with a common philosophy, language, and purpose.⁴² Doctrine can provide unity of effort only if it is developed, used, and shared.

The number of U.S. doctrinal publications for joint operations has increased significantly. The Joint Staff has taken an active role in its development--working constantly to

produce current doctrinal publications.⁴³ Two of those publications include joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for peace operations and for humanitarian assistance operations.⁴⁴

Although joint doctrine has increased, there is an absence of multinational doctrine to guide allies and coalition partners in peace operations. Unlike the Joint Staff, the responsibility for developing strategic and operational multinational doctrine is not clear. U.S. doctrine can be used for multinational operations as a transition.⁴⁵ However, the complexity of multinational peace operations demand closer examination and doctrine development by the appropriate and responsible agencies (e.g., UN). The need for multinational and multiagency doctrine is highlighted by Russian Colonel Andrei Demurenko, Sector Sarajevo Chief of Staff in Bosnia, who declares "More joint manuals are needed for PK [peace keeping] forces, especially at the UN level."⁴⁶ The availability of such doctrine could define failure (e.g., Somalia) or success (e.g., U.S. doctrine supported the Bosnia operation).

Civilian agencies involved in peace operations also have testified to the need for doctrinal guidance. Kevin Kennedy, a Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer at the UN Department of

Affairs, recently cited the importance of joint doctrinal development for civil-military operation centers.⁴⁷ Certainly, civil and humanitarian agencies that contribute to those operations should offer input to the doctrine, particularly IOs (e.g., International Red Cross) who frequently are involved in operations with the United States Armed Forces.

Planning

Planning also provides a mechanism for achieving coordinated effort. The U.S. joint military community has a strong, proven record for planning. With the support of the military, recent interagency efforts have enhanced the interagency planning and coordination for complex contingency operations.⁴⁸ In particular, the U.S. military contributed to the development of political-military implementation (pol-mil) plans that are used to focus the interagency community for a known crisis. An IWG uses the pol-mil plan as a tool to articulate the critical operational elements of an operation, such as mission, objectives, desired endstates, key milestones and the concept of the operation.

The planning tools discussed above work best when time is available and the crisis is known. However, many of the peace operations today come with little notification. Such planning

may be too late. In today's peace operations, reliance on regional planning at the combatant commands, and with Ambassadors and their County Teams will become more critical.

Likewise, civilian agencies must be actively used in the development of regional plans. However, civilian organizations--governmental and nongovernmental, national or international--often do not have similar planning mechanisms. Nor are these various organizations incorporated into each other's planning process to achieve best results. Involving civilian organizations in other routine planning for missions will provide familiarity which will enhance coordination during a crisis. Also, early planning for contingencies can reduce turbulence during transition in hand-offs from military to civilian organizations and vice versa. Without such integration, much of the value of planning is lost. As Kevin Kennedy points out:

The presence of representatives from the humanitarian community (OFDA [Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance], NGOs, UN agencies) at all levels during the planning process, and particularly with the units who will actually perform the mission, would have a positive effect on subsequent military-humanitarian relations. Whilst each institution has their own unique requirements and missions, sufficient interests exist to create a functioning partnership prior to operations in the field.⁴⁹

Because civilian agencies and the military can perform similar functions in peace operations, a lack of adequate

coordination inevitably leads to confusion. To achieve unity of effort, each party must understand the other's capabilities and build on those strengths. For example, the military is capable of responding quickly to crises. Although some civilian agencies are not staffed to do extensive planning or to respond quickly to crises, organizations such as UN Humanitarian Coordinators and other NGOs/PVOs are often in the country early. So they can provide unique and valuable information.⁵⁰ Even though civilian agencies are not staffed to conduct prior planning in every case, developing shared skills through institutional training will enhance future success.

Planning among nations is also essential to unity of effort. Comparison of the planning for the Somalia and Haiti peace operations, for example, highlights the impact and importance of quality planning. In Somalia, even though the operation was supported by a UN resolution, little planning was done by the UN. Further, U.S. planning on behalf of the UN was not effectively integrated.⁵¹ Haiti's planning was better, as highlighted by David Bentley and Ambassador Robert Oakley, former Special Representative to Somalia:

Because of a lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II [UN Operation Somalia II] military commanders had no understanding of the transition; the number, capability, or concept of employment of their forces; or the rules of engagement.... Preparations for Haiti

were better. The U.S.-led Multi-National Force (MNF) and the follow-on UN-led UNMIH [in Haiti] were established by UNSC [UN Security Council] Resolution....A **60-person UN planning team** went to Haiti in October 1994 to **work with the MNF**, and experienced personnel of the UN Secretariat worked closely with U.S. planners from the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and the Joint Staff. There were numerous visits and interchanges of ideas between the U.S. and the UN, leading to a mutually approved transition plan and subsequent plan for on-going UNMIH operations.⁵²

In summary, unity of effort is achieved through effective implementation of such mechanisms as alliances and agreements, shared information, liaison teams and early integrated planning. Tomorrow's challenge is to sustain continued commitment to the development of those mechanism, in a time of reduced national budgets. The scope and complexity of planning for many multinational peace operations requires identifying all the actors, integrating them into the planning process, and developing effective plans that will provide focus and facilitate coordination. To coordinate the efforts of multiple agencies and multinational partners in peace or humanitarian operations, structures and mechanisms, such as the CJTFs, can integrate capabilities through effective early planning.

Conclusions and Recommendations

A national commitment to preventive defense and preventive diplomacy will generate increased U.S. participation in multinational operations that will include military and civilian organizations. The frequency, complexity and scope of multinational and multiagency coordination has significantly challenged the ability of strategic leaders to achieve unity of effort. While this study has focused on unity of effort in peace operations, the utility of the issues discussed can apply to other types of operations: humanitarian assistance operations, disaster relief, support to civil authorities, or even wartime missions.

Now is the time to improve the U.S. ability to ensure unity of effort when working with other nations and agencies. To promote unity of effort, the United States should undertake the following initiatives:

■ **Conduct a Study on Governmental and Nongovernmental Coordination.**

The National Defense University should undertake a study in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, and other departments and civilian agencies, as appropriate, to examine potential solutions to the issues discussed in this study. In conducting operations with nongovernmental agencies, America's governmental agencies are in un-charted territory. The study

should identify problems inherent in differing political-military cultures; find new ways and mechanisms to improve interagency connectivity; and determine the best value for the interchange of liaison officers between agencies. The report should be completed within a year. It should recommend actions to enhance unity of effort in national and international coordination, particularly in multiagency peace operations.

■ **Integrate U.S. Planning Techniques with Coalition and Civilian Agencies**

Regional conflict planning should involve all the relevant actors and integrate all instruments of power--to focus their efforts and resources while working together for a common purpose. International organizations, regional alliances and organizations, NGOs and PVOs must be brought into the interagency planning process from the start. When possible, such organizations should be incorporated into national and theater level planning for operations. This can be done formally (e.g., within the interagency process or NATO) or within the combatant commands.

■ **Invite Selected Nongovernmental Agencies to Attend Senior Service Colleges.**

National agencies (e.g., USAID) and international agencies (e.g., International Red Cross) should be invited to attend our

Senior U.S. Service Colleges. Unity of effort among governmental agencies (i.e., military services-joint and foreign, State Department, FEMA, CIA) has been developed through training and education in formal academic institutions and other fora. It is time to include other national and international agencies in this training. Their participation in senior service schools will build common understanding, contribute to the development of common doctrine, and establish personal relationships and trust, thereby ensuring timely and successful coordination between future "partners." At a minimum, national and international agencies should be invited to short orientation courses that provide team-building exercises with senior service college participants.

■ **Expand Negotiation Skills for Field Grade Officers.**

Negotiations training (core and electives) at Senior Service Colleges should be expanded. Similar courses should be established at the Command and General Staff College.

ENDNOTES

¹ David S. Alberts, "Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations," October 1994, <<http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/z1001.html>>, 31 January 1997.

² Paul D. Miller, Retaining Alliance Relevancy: NATO and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1994), 9.

³ Department of Defense, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 24 February 1995), III-3.

⁴ Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), Glossary-9.

⁵ Joint Publication 0-2, I-9.

⁶ Department of Defense, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 January 1995), III-1.

⁷ J. David Whaley, "Improving UN Developmental Co-ordination within Peace Missions," International Peacekeeping 3, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 109-110.

⁸ National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Interagency Training for Complex Contingency Operations, B-6 (Washington: unknown, December 1996), B-5. Information is contained in Annex B: Background Reading; "The Interagency Process and Planning for Complex Contingencies.

⁹ Sam Nunn, "Future Trends in Defense Organization," Joint Force Quarterly, 13 (Autumn 1996): 65.

¹⁰ Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are described in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2, "Organization of the National Security Council," January 20, 1993. PDD 2 authorizes IWGs: "some permanent, others ad hoc." The chair of each NSC/IWG will vary. For example, international economic issues are suppose to be chaired by the Department of Treasury or the National Economic Council (NEC). The Department of Commerce is

not specifically prescribed in PDD 2. Also, DoD has no standing member on the NEC but are invited as an ad hoc member depending upon issues. These "ad hoc" arrangements may lend themselves to inconsistencies in decisionmaking, resulting in a lack of unity of effort.

¹¹ William T. Johnsen, Douglas V. Johnson II, James O. Kievit, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Steven Metz, The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1995), 9.

¹² Strategy equals ends plus ways plus means as described by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 12 March 1993), 3. The development of strategy begins with the National Security Strategy. Then, it is used by the DoD to formulate the National Military Strategy (NMS). Subsequently, the combatant commanders uses NSS and NMS along with other planning systems (i.e., JOPES) and command plans (i.e., Unified Command Plan) to develop their strategy. Failure to integrate instruments of power at all levels, results in a cascading effect. If strategic guidance on all appropriate instruments of power are not clearly articulated and integrated, a lack of focus may occur at the lower levels. For example, if the political strategy in a theater of operation is unclear, the operational commanders may not blend and integrate the appropriate level of economic considerations.

¹³ Interagency Training for Complex Contingency Operations: Read-Ahead Material, 2. The second annual interagency training was co-sponsored by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, the National Defense University, and the Foreign Service Institute, under the Direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements in joint effort with the National Security Council Staff, Department of State and Department of Defense to enhance interagency planning and coordination for Complex Contingency Operations.

¹⁴ Andrew S. Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief Interventions in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," International Peacekeeping 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 81-84. The monetization strategy in Somalia had the greatest potential for turning around the situation in Somalia. The strategy was complex and barriers were

underestimated. The monetization strategy is best understood by examining the objectives. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) strategy in Southern Somalia had 5 critical objectives: stop the starvation and then stabilize the food prices; increase the security of the relief effort; discourage the exodus of Somalis from their villages and encourage resettlement; mass employment programmes to get young men off the street, get the economy going and rehab the ruined infrastructure; and decentralize the relief effort to the smaller cities and villages.

¹⁵ Ibid., 79.

¹⁶ The NSC is made up of four statutory members: President, Vice-President, Secretaries of State and Defense. Presidential Decision Directive 2, "Organization of the National Security Council," 20 January 1993, identifies additional permanent members to include the Secretary of Treasury, U.S. Representative (with Ambassador status to the UN), Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (extracted from Joint Pub 3-07.6 Draft, Chapter II, "Organization and Interagency Coordination," 1 March 1996, II-2). Although the PDD gives some legitimacy for economic representation on the NSC, it does not fully bind (by law) the members to the NSC. Changing of the statutory law will fully integrate the agency and the instruments of power. Some critics of this proposal will argue that the addition of the two Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce will complicate an already complex national decisionmaking apparatus. This proposal and its development is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if we are committed to a fully collaborative, integrated use of the instruments of power, then perhaps it is time to give equal consideration to all instruments, particularly, economic. At a minimum, the IAWGs must continue to assess and include this instrument of power in its consideration to preclude failures as the U.S. experienced in Somalia.

¹⁷ James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly, 13 (Autumn 1996): 13. Additional authority included organizing commands and forces, employing forces, employing forces, assigning command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinating and approving aspects of administration and support, selecting and suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.

¹⁸ Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," 13.

¹⁹ John P. White, "Defense Organization Today," Joint Force Quarterly, 13 (Autumn 1996): 22.

²⁰ Throughout the Autumn 1996 issue of Joint Force Quarterly Congressional members, Defense executives, and former and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act by illustrating the improvements in the CINC's authority, improving strategy making and planning, and enhancing operational effectiveness. Other writers talk of the need for additional improvements. For example, former Sam Nunn highlighted DoD's need to overcome excessive bureaucracy, develop a quicker response to new missions, and reduce the ambiguity of administrative responsibilities. Sam Nunn, "Future Trends in Defense Organization," Joint Force Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1996): 63.

²¹ William W. Mendel and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Planning For a New Threat Environment," July 1996, <<http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/geo/PUBS/cincstrt.htm>>, 30 November 1996.

²² Kevin M. Kennedy, "The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope," International Peacekeeping 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 108-109. The article talks about the fundamentally different interpretation of the mission between different military contingents within UNITAF, as well as differences within the same contingent.

²³ John M. Shalikashvili, "The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection," Defense Issues, 11, no. 39 (May 1996): 2.

²⁴ Ibid., 4.

²⁵ George A. Joulwan, "NATO and the New SHAPE," The Retired Officer Magazine 53, no. 3 (March 1997): 37.

²⁶ Timothy L. Thomas, "Russian Lessons Learned in Bosnia," Military Review 76, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 40.

²⁷ George A. Joulwan, "European Command's Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness," Defense Issues, 11, no. 41 (19 March 1996): 3.

²⁸ Martha E. Maurer, Coalition Command and Control: Key Considerations (Washington, DC: National Defense University, May 1996), xii.

²⁹ Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 31 August 1992), 21-22.

³⁰ Miller, Retaining Alliance Relevancy, 6-7.

³¹ Examples of a long term agreements within NATO are NATO's Standardization Agreements (STANAGs).

³² Johnsen, et al., 10.

³³ Whaley, 125-139.

³⁴ Guy C. Swan III, "Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization-Military Gap," Military Review 76, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 34.

³⁵ Negotiation, in this sense, advances mutual interests in a joint problem-solving process.

³⁶ Joseph J. Redden, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995), 47.

³⁷ David E. Shaver, U.S. Army Negotiating Expertise: Do We Have What We Need? Strategic Studies Institute Special Report, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 30 March 1993, 12.

³⁸ National Defense University, "The Complexity of Operations is Increasing," 1995, <<http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa95/sach1301.html>>, 31 January 1997.

³⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 1995), 27.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 26.

⁴¹ Shalikashvili, "The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection," 5.

⁴² Department of Defense, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 January 1995), I-3.

⁴³ Selected joint doctrine manuals include: Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995; Joint Publication 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense, 26 June 1995; Joint Publication 3-07.2, Anti-Terrorism, 25 June 1993; Joint Publication 3-07.4, Counter-Drug Operations, 9 August 1994; Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, 9 October 96; Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, 21 June 1995; Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995.

⁴⁴ Department of Defense, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 April 1994); Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.6 (Draft) (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 August 1995).

⁴⁵ Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, **in development** as of 26 February 1997).

⁴⁶ Thomas, 40.

⁴⁷ Kennedy, 110.

⁴⁸ Interagency Training for Complex Contingency Operations, 1.

⁴⁹ Kennedy, 109.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 95-97. For example, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs were present in Bosnia from 1991-1995.

⁵¹ David Bentley and Robert Oakley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti," May 1995, <<http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum30.html>>, 27 February 1997, 1.

⁵² Ibid., 1-2.

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